Abstract-In recent years, the protection of biometric data has gained increased interest from the scientific community. Methods such as the fuzzy commitment scheme, helper-data system, fuzzy extractors, fuzzy vault, and cancelable biometrics have been proposed for protecting biometric data. Most of these methods use cryptographic primitives or error-correcting codes (ECCs) and use a binary representation of the real-valued biometric data. Hence, the difference between two biometric samples is given by the Hamming distance (HD) or bit errors between the binary vectors obtained from the enrollment and verification phases, respectively. If the HD is smaller (larger) than the decision threshold, then the subject is accepted (rejected) as genuine. Because of the use of ECCs, this decision threshold is limited to the maximum error-correcting capacity of the code, consequently limiting the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate tradeoff. A method to improve the FRR consists of using multiple biometric samples in either the enrollment or verification phase. The noise is suppressed, hence reducing the number of bit errors and decreasing the HD. In practice, the number of samples is empirically chosen without fully considering its fundamental impact. In this paper, we present a Gaussian analytical framework for estimating the performance of a binary biometric system given the number of samples being used in the enrollment and the verification phase. The error-detection tradeoff curve that combines the false acceptance and false rejection rates is estimated to assess the system performance. The analytic expressions are validated using the Face Recognition Grand Challenge v2 and Fingerprint Verification Competition 2000 biometric databases.
by privacy protection watchdogs. This has stimulated research into methods for protecting the biometric data in order to mitigate these privacy concerns. Numerous methods such as the fuzzy commitment scheme [1] , helper-data system [2] [3] [4] , fuzzy extractors [5] , [6] , fuzzy vault [7] , [8] , and cancelable biometrics [9] have been proposed for transforming the biometric data in such a way that the privacy is safeguarded. Several of these privacy or template-protection techniques use some cryptographic primitives (e.g., hash functions) or errorcorrecting codes (ECC). Therefore, they use a binary representation of the biometric data, referred to as the binary vector. The transition from real valued to binary representation of the biometric allows the difference between two biometric samples to be quantified by the Hamming distance (HD), i.e., the number of different bits (bit errors) between two binary vectors.
Eventually, the biometric system has to verify the claimed identity of a subject. If verified, this identity is considered as genuine. The decision of either rejecting or accepting the subject as genuine depends on whether the HD is larger than a predetermined decision threshold (T ). In template-protection systems that use an ECC, T is usually determined by its error-correcting capacity. Hence, the false rejection rate (FRR) depends on the number of genuine matches that produce an HD that is larger than the decision threshold.
Attackers may attempt to gain access by impersonating a genuine user. The associated comparisons are referred to as the impostor comparisons and will be accepted if the HD is smaller or equal to T , thus leading to a false accept. The success rate of impersonation attacks is quantified by the false acceptance rate (FAR).
Therefore, the performance of a biometric system can be expressed by its FAR and FRR, which depends on the genuine (φ ge ) and impostor (φ im ) HD probability mass functions (pmfs) and the decision threshold T . A graphical representation is shown in Fig. 1 .
One of the problems with template-protection systems based on ECCs is that the FRR is lower (LB) bounded by the error-correcting capacity of the ECC. A large FRR makes the biometric system inconvenient because many genuine subjects will be wrongly rejected. In some practical cases [2] , [3] , high FRR values were obtained because it was impossible to further increase the decision boundary since the used ECC was unable to correct more bits. The method they used to improve the FRR consists in using multiple biometric samples in order to suppress the noise and thus reduce the number of bit errors resulting in a smaller HD.
The main objective of this paper is to analytically estimate, under the Gaussian assumption, the performance of a biometric system based on binary vectors under HD comparison and considering the use of multiple biometric samples. We present a framework for analytically estimating both the genuine and impostor HD pmfs from the analytically estimated bit-error probability presented in [10] under the assumption that both the within and between class of the real-valued features are Gaussian distributed. First, due to the central-limit theorem, we can assume that the real-valued features will tend to approximate a Gaussian distribution when they result from a linear combinations of many components, e.g., feature-extraction techniques based on the principle component analysis (PCA) or linear discriminant analysis (LDA). PCA or LDA techniques are often being used to perform dimension reduction in order to prevent overfitting or to simplify the classifier [11] , and in the field of template protection, PCA is also used to decorrelate the features in order to guarantee uniformly distributed keys extracted from the biometric sample [5] . Second, the Gaussian assumption makes it possible to obtain an analytical closedform expression for the HD pmf. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a general description of a biometric system with template protection and model each processing component. We present the Gaussian model assumption describing the probability density function (pdf) of the real-valued biometric features extracted from the biometric sample, the binarization method under consideration, and the interpretation of the template-protection block. Then, we present the analytic expression for estimating the genuine and impostor HD pmfs and the FRR and FAR curves in Section III. In Section IV, we validate these analytic expressions with two different real biometric databases, namely, the Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) v2 3-D face images [12] and the Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) 2000 fingerprint images [13] . We further extend the framework in Sections V and VI in order to relax the assumptions made in Section II. Furthermore, some practical considerations are discussed in Section VII. Section VIII concludes this paper and outlines the future work.
II. MODELING OF A BIOMETRIC SYSTEM WITH TEMPLATE PROTECTION
A general scheme of a biometric system with template protection based on helper data is shown in Fig. 2 . In the enrollment phase, a biometric sample, for example, a 3-D shape image of the face of the subject, is obtained by the acquisition system and presented to the Feature-Extraction module. The biometric sample is preprocessed (enhancement, alignment, etc.) and a real-valued feature vector f e R ∈ R N F is extracted, where N F is the number of feature components or dimension of the feature vector. In the Bit-Extraction module, a binary vector f e B ∈ {0, 1} N B is extracted from the real-valued feature vector, where N B is the number of bits and, in general, does not need to be equal to N F . Quantization schemes range from simple, extracting a single bit out of each feature component [2] , [3] to more complex, extracting multiple bits per feature component [14] , [15] . Hereafter, the binary vector is protected within the Bit-Protection module. The Bit-Protection module safeguards the privacy of the users of the biometric system by enabling accurate comparisons without the need to store the original biometric data f e R or f e B . We focus on the helper-data system that is based on ECCs and cryptographic primitives, for example, hash functions. A unique but renewable key is generated for each user and kept secret by using a hash function. Robustness to measurement noise and biometric variability is achieved by effectively using ECCs. The output is a pseudoidentity (P I), represented as a binary vector, accompanied by some auxiliary data that are also known as helper data (AD) [16] . Finally, P I and AD have to be stored for use in the verification phase.
In the verification phase, another live biometric measurement is acquired from which its real-valued feature vector f v R is extracted followed by the quantization process, which produces the binary vector f v B . In the Bit-Protection module, a candidate pseudoidentity P I * is created using AD and the binary vector f v B . There is an exact match between P I and P I * when the same AD is presented together with a biometric sample with similar characteristics as the one presented in the enrollment phase. In a classical biometric system, the comparator bases its decision on the similarity or distance between the feature vectors f e R and f v R . For a binary biometric system, the decision is based on the difference between f e B and f v B , which can be quantified using the HD. For a template-protection system, there is an acceptance only when P I and P I * are identical. In summary, the biometric system incorporating template protection can be divided into three blocks: 1) the Acquisition and Feature-Extraction modules, where the input is the subject's biometrics and the output is a real-valued feature vector f R ∈ R N F ; 2) the Bit-Extraction module that extracts a binary vector f B out of f R ; and 3) the Bit-Protection and BitMatching modules which protect the binary vector and perform the matching and decision making based on P I and P I * . To build an analytical framework, we have to model each block. In this section, we present a simple model for each block. However, the simple model incorporating the Acquisition and Feature-Extraction block is built under strong assumptions and will be relaxed later in this paper. 
A. Acquisition and Feature-Extraction Block
The input of the Acquisition and Feature-Extraction block is a captured biometric sample of the subject, and the output is a real-valued feature vector
where " " is the transpose operator. The feature vector f R is likely to be different between two measurements, even if they are acquired immediately after each other. Causes for this difference include sensor noise, environment conditions (e.g., illumination), and biometric variabilities (e.g., pose or expression).
To model these variabilities, we consider parallel Gaussian channels (PGCs) as shown in Fig. 3 . We assume an ideal Acquisition and Feature-Extraction module which always produces the same feature vector μ i for subject i. Such ideal module is thus robust against all aforementioned variabilities. However, the variability of component j is modeled as an additive zeromean Gaussian noise w The observed variability within one subject is characterized by the variance of the within-class pdf and is referred to as within-class variability. We assume that each subject has the same within-class variance, i.e., homogeneous within-class variance σ On the other hand, each subject should have a unique mean in order to be distinguishable. Across the population, we assume μ i [j] to be another Gaussian random variable with density
across the population is referred to as the between-class variability. Fig. 4 shows an example of the within-class and between-class pdfs for a specific component and a given subject. The total pdf describes the observed real-valued feature value f R [j] across the whole population and is also Gaussian with
. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we consider
As shown in Fig. 3 , in both the enrollment and verification phase, the PGC adds random noise w e and w v with the same probability density to μ i , resulting in f e R and f v R , respectively. Thus, μ i is sent twice over the same Gaussian channel.
B. Bit-Extraction Block
The function of the Bit-Extraction block is to extract a binary representation from the real-valued representation of the biometric sample. As a bit-extraction method, we use the thresholding version used in [2] and [3] , where a single bit is extracted from each feature component. Hence, the obtained binary vector f B ∈ {0, 1} N F has the same dimension as f R . Furthermore, the binarization threshold for each component δ [j] is set equal to the mean of the between-class pdf μ b [j]; if the value of f R [j] is smaller than δ[j], then it is set to "0," otherwise it is set to "1." (see Fig. 4 ). More complex binarization schemes could be used [14] , [15] , but the simple binarization is used more frequently. Therefore, we only focus on the singlebit binarization method. Note that the binarization method is similar in both the enrollment and verification phase. In the case where multiple biometric samples are used in either the enrollment (N e ) or verification (N v ) phase, the average of all the corresponding f R is taken prior to the binarization process.
C. Bit-Protection and Bit-Comparator Block
Many bit-protection or template-protection schemes are based on the capability of generating a robust binary vector or key out of different biometric measurements of the same subject. However, the binary input vector f B itself cannot be used as the key because it is most likely not exactly the same in both the enrollment and verification phase (f . Therefore, ECCs are used to deal with these bit errors. A possible way of integrating an ECC is shown in Fig. 5 , which is also known as the fuzzy commitment scheme [1] .
In the enrollment phase, a binary secret or message vector s is randomly generated by the Random-Number-Generator module. The security level of the system is higher at larger in order to obtain the auxiliary data AD. Furthermore, the hash of s is taken in order to obtain the pseudoidentity P I. For the sake of coherence, we use the terminology proposed in [16] and [17] .
In the verification phase, the possibly corrupted codeword c * is created by XORing f v B with AD. The candidate secret s * is obtained by decoding c * in the ECC-Decoder module. We compute the candidate pseudoidentity P I * by hashing s * . The decision in the Bit-Comparator block is based on whether P I and P I * are bitwise identical. In order to illustrate our framework with practical parameter values, we choose the linear block-type "Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, Hocquenghem" (BCH) encoder/decoder as an example ECC. While more sophisticated ECCs can be used, the BCH accommodates our framework due to its HD classifier property. For example, if we would consider the binary-symbol-based Reed-Solomon code, the number of bits it can correct depends on the error pattern. Hence, their probabilistic decoding behavior also needs to be modeled, which is out of the scope of the framework described in this paper. The ECC is specified by the codeword length (n c ), message length (k c ), and the corresponding number of bits that can be corrected (t c ); in short [n c , k c , t c ]. Because the BCH ECC can correct random bit errors, the Bit-Protection module yields equivalent P I and P I * when the number of bit errors between the binary vectors f Table I . Note that the maximum number of bits that can be corrected lies between 20% and 25% of the binary vector.
D. Modeling Summary
The following is a summary of the modeling choices and assumptions that we have made.
• Acquisition and Feature-Extraction Block f R -Modeled as a PGC, where each feature component is defined by:
• Within-class pdf ∼ N (0, σ 
III. ANALYTICAL ESTIMATION OF BIT-ERROR PROBABILITIES, FRR, AND FAR
The goal of this paper is to analytically estimate the performance of the presented general template-protection system. In Section II, we have presented a comprehensive description of such a system, including the modeling approach or properties of each block that forms the basis of our analytic framework. In case of an HD classifier, the goal is to analytically estimate the expected genuine and impostor HD pmfs φ ge and (φ im ), respectively (see Fig. 1 ). With these pmfs, we can compute the FRR β and the FAR α, where β is the probability that a genuine subject is incorrectly rejected and α is the probability that an impostor is incorrectly accepted by the biometric system.
The HD between two binary vectors is the number of bit errors between them. Knowing the bit-error probability for each bit P e [j], the expected HDd H between f e B and f
(
Further, we define the pmf of the number of bit errors of component j as
, where P j (0) is the probability of no bit error (d H = 0) and P j (1) is the probability of a single bit error (d H = 1). Under the assumption that the bit-error probabilities are independent, the pmf of
where the convolution is taken of the pmf of the number of bit errors per component. A toy example is shown in Fig. 6 . For the two extreme cases of (2), we have
which are the probabilities of having zero or N F errors, respectively. The FRR corresponding to an HD threshold T β(T ) is the probability that the HD for a genuine comparison is greater than T , therefore
Furthermore, α(T ) is the probability that the HD for an impostor comparison is smaller or equal to the threshold T , hence we have
In other words, if we want to estimate β(T ) and α(T ) analytically, we have to obtain an analytic closed-form expression of the average bit-error probability P e [j] across the population for both the genuine and impostor case, P [j], respectively. Furthermore, we also want to find the relationship between P ge e [j] and the number of enrollment N e and verification N v samples. As mentioned in Section II-B, in case of multiple samples, the average of the extracted f R of each sample is taken prior to the binarization process.
A. P e Estimation for the Impostor Case: P im e
For the impostor case, we are considering the comparison between binary vectors of two different subjects
As mentioned in Section II-B, we focus on the binarization method based on thresholding with δ = μ b = μ t (see Fig. 4 ). Because the total pdf is assumed to be Gaussian with mean μ t , we have equiprobable bit values. This implies that the bit-error probability of randomly guessing a bit is 1/2, P im e [j] = 1/2 ∀j. Thus, under the assumption that the feature components are independent, impostor comparisons are similar to matching f e B with a random binary vector. Since P im e [j] = 1/2 ∀j, we can simplify φ im (k) as the binomial pmf where the simplification step from (7)- (8) holds because of
which corresponds to what is used in [18] .
B. P e Estimation for the Genuine Case: P ge e
We focus on estimating the bit-error probability for each component P ge e [j], and for convenience purposes, we omit the component index j. Using the Gaussian model approach as defined in Section II and shown in Fig. 7 , the expected bit-error probability P ge e over the whole population is defined by P
where P ge e (μ) is the bit-error probability given μ and p b is the between-class pdf. With the binarization threshold δ = μ b = 0, this problem becomes symmetric with respect to δ. Consequently, (11) becomes
where λ = 1/ √ 2σ b . We define the measurement or acquisition-error probability P a , shown by the shaded area in Fig. 7 , as the probability that the measured bit is different than the bit defined by the mean μ of the feature value. P a becomes smaller at either a larger distance between μ and the binarization threshold δ or a smaller within-class variance. Since multiple enrollment (N e ) and verification (N v ) samples are considered, P a also depends on the number of samples N , given as
where we used the fact that when averaging N samples, the within-class variance decreases as
With the use of the error function
and by defining η =( √ N/ √ 2σ w ), P a (μ; N ) can be rewritten as
where we used the well-known result
There is a bit-error probability only when there is a measurement error at either the enrollment or the verification phase. If there is a measurement error in both phases, then the measured bits still have the same bit value thus, no bit error. Hence, P e (μ) of (12) becomes
where (17) into (12), we obtain
The integral of the erf function can be solved using the general solution of erf integrals [19] given as
Thus, (18) can be solved by using (19) with γ = λ 2 , a = η e , and b = η v as
where we also included σ w and σ b as an argument of the estimation function. As can be observed, P ge e is dependent on the σ b /σ w ratio, N e , and N v .
C. Summary
We have presented the analytic expressions of the genuine (φ ge ) and impostor (φ im ) HD pmfs and the corresponding FRR (β(T )) and FAR (α(T )) curves. Because of the choice of the binarization scheme, the impostor bit-error probability P im e [j] does not need to be estimated and can be assumed to be equal to 1/2 for each feature component. However, the genuine biterror probability P ge e [j] has to be estimated using the analytic expression in (20) . Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we only need to estimate P ge e [j], and for convenience reason, we frequently omit the ge superscript.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION WITH BIOMETRIC DATABASES
In this section, the analytic expressions and the effect of the Gaussian assumption are validated using two real biometric databases, which are discussed in Section IV-A. To estimate P e [j] using (20), we need to estimate the within-and betweenclass variances σ [j], respectively. In Section IV-B, we show that the within-class variance influences the betweenclass variance estimation, and we present a corrected estimator. Due to the limited size of the databases, estimation errors do occur when estimating P e [j], even in the case when the underlying model is correct. We account for these errors by estimating the 95 percentile boundaries in Section IV-C. We then present the results of estimating P e [j] in Section IV-D and the effect of using PCA as a means to generate uncorrelated features in Section IV-E. We conclude by portraying the experimental 
, and detection error tradeoff (DET) curves in Section IV-F.
A. Biometric Databases and Feature Extraction
The first database (db1) consists of 3-D face images from the FRGC v2 data set [12] , where we used the shape-based 3-D face recognizer of [20] to extract feature vectors of dimension N orig = 696. Subjects with at least eight samples were selected resulting in N s = 230 subjects with a total of N t = 3147 samples. The number of samples per subject varies between 8 and 22 with an approximate average ofN i = 14 samples per subject. The second database (db2) consists of fingerprint images from the database 2 of FVC2000 [13] and uses a feature-extraction algorithm based on Gabor filters and directional fields [21] , resulting in 1536 features (N orig = 1536). There are N s = 110 subjects with N i = 8 samples each. An overview is given in Table II. The components of the original feature vectors are dependent. Therefore, we applied the PCA technique to decorrelate the features and reduce the dimension of the feature space if necessary. Furthermore, we partitioned both databases into a training and testing set containing 25% and 75% of the number of subjects, respectively. The size of the test set is a very important factor in this analytic framework; thus, we traded off the size of the training set and limited it to 25% of the number of subjects. We applied PCA on the training set and reduced the dimensionality (N F ) of the feature vectors to the codeword lengths presented in Table I and computed the equal error rate (EER) (see Fig. 8 ), which is defined as the point where FAR equals FRR. The optimal performance is computed using the bit-extraction method in Section II-B and an HD classifier. The optimal number of features for both db1 and db2 are in the range of 15, 31, and 63. Note that the best EER of 12.7% for db1 and 15.2% for db2 is higher than the reported performance of template-protection systems based on these databases in the literature (≈8% for db1 in [2] [23] and ≈5% for db2 in [22] ).
1 However, our proposed analytic framework is not focused on optimizing the performance but on analytically estimating the performance. The effect of the PCA transformation on the feature value distribution and the error probability estimation is discussed in Section IV-E. Unless stated otherwise, the remainder of this analysis is based on the PCA transformed test set using the PCA matrix obtained from the training set. For convenience, the remainder of this work is mainly focused on the optimal setting of N F = 31. The analytic expression P table given in Table III from [23] , where f i,j is the jth real-valued feature vector of subject i, N s is the number of subjects, N i is the number of samples or feature vectors of subject i, and N t is the total number of samples;
B. Variance Estimation of σ
This table is also used in analysis of variance models and describes the method for computing the sum of squares of the source of the within-class (SSW), betweenclass (SSB), and the total (SST) variation. Two important facts derived from this table are that: 1) the total sum of squares is equal to the sum of the within-class and between-class sum of squares SST = SSW + SSB and 2) the total number of degrees of freedom (d.f.) is equal to the sum of the between-class and the within-class d.f. The details are in [23] . With the use of the table, the variance estimation is given as the sum of squares divided by the d.f., thuŝ
with the exception ofσ 2 b , which is also divided by the average number of samples per subjectN i . Notice thatσ 2 w is calculated as the variance of the aggregated zero-mean samples of the subjects, while taking into account that N s d.f. are lost because of the need to estimate the mean of each subjectμ i . Furthermore, 1 In [2] , the most reliable feature components were selected, and in [22] , six enrollment samples were used. σ 2 w is also equal to the weighted average of the variance of each subject because (21) can also be written aŝ (21), (22) , and (23), respectively. The synthesis and estimation processes are performed ten times (tenfold), and the average of the result is taken. Fig. 9 shows the estimation results ofσ Fig. 10(a) and (b) , respectively. The figures show that the estimation error increases when σ w increases or when N i decreases.
The constant estimation error ofσ 2 b is caused by the estimation error of the sample mean of each subjectμ i . From [23] , we know that the variance of the sampling distribution of the sample meanμ i is given by
If more samples are taken to estimate the sample mean, the estimation variance decreases. This implies that the estimation 
C. Boundaries of Tolerated Estimation Errors
When estimating P e [j] of a given biometric database, there are always estimation errors because of its random nature. Even if we randomly generate a synthetic database that fully complies with the Gaussian modeling assumption, there are still estimation errors. These estimation errors are caused by the random nature of the problem and should be tolerated. Hence, we compute the upper (UB) and LB tolerance bounds for the estimation errors. Such an example is shown in Fig. 11 for a synthetic data set of similar size as db2 (N s = 110 and N i = 8) but with N F = 500 and σ We empirically estimate the UB and LB boundaries by clustering the points into equidistant intervals on the x-axis and compute the 95 percentile range of theP 
D. Validation of the Analytic Expression P ge e
In this section, we experimentally validate the analytic expression of the bit-error probability P ge e . In the previous section, we have discussed the use of PCA for decorrelating the feature components and for reducing the dimension to N F = 31. In order to have more components for the validation, we apply PCA but without reducing the number of features. Hence, we consider the original number of features (696) for database db1. However, for database db2, we only consider 223 components since 25% of the total number of subjects (i.e., 28 subjects) with a total of 224 feature vectors were used to derive the PCA projection. Thus, to avoid singularities, we have reduced the number of features to 223.
To assess the model assumptions, we compared the estimated bit-error probability of the biometric databaseP We refer to the number of disks as the estimation error P e . If all the assumptions hold, then we expect the relative P e to be around 5%. Table IV reports the absolute and relative P e . Because P e is noisy due to the random selection of N e and N v samples within the test protocol, we repeat the estimation 20 times and report its mean. For db1, P e is 16.7% for N e = N v = 1 and decreases to 13% for N e = N v = 4. In the case of db2, P e is very large; 27.3% for N e = N v = 1 but decreases significantly when both N e and N v are increased, reaching 6.3% when N e = N v = 4. Thus, for both databases, there is a clear improvement when increasing the number of samples. We conjecture that the improved bit-error probability estimation performance is due to the fact that the feature value distribution becomes more Gaussian when averaging multiple samples as stated by the central-limit theorem [24] . In addition, note that manyP db1 e
[j] estimations of db1 are very close to the 95 percentile boundaries, hence, small estimation errors can lead to large variation in P e that could explain the biterror probability-estimation-performance differences between db1 and db2 observed in the table.
E. Effect of PCA on the Gaussian Assumption
As described in Section II, the analytic framework is based on the Gaussian model assumption. Fig. 14(a) and (c) shows the normal probability plot for each component of the feature vectors of db1 and db2, respectively, before applying the PCA transformation. The normal probability plot is a graphical technique for assessing the degree to which a data set approximates a Gaussian distribution. If the curve of the data closely follows the dashed-thick line, then the data can be assumed to be approximately Gaussian distributed. Prior to comparing, we normalized each feature so that it has zero mean and unit variance. For both databases, it is evident that the distributions before applying PCA are not Gaussian because they significantly deviate from the dashed-thick line that represents a perfect Gaussian distribution. Fig. 14(b) and (d) shows the normal probability plot for each of the 696 components of db1 and the 223 components of db2, respectively, after applying PCA. For both databases, the figures show that after applying PCA, the features tend to behave more like Gaussians. Yet, the tails deviate the most from being Gaussian where for the most cases the empirical distribution is wider. Fig. 15 shows the P e estimations before applying PCA for both databases in two cases: N e = N v = 1 and N e = N v = 4. Note that before PCA, db1 and db2 have 696 and 1536 components, respectively. For db1 P e is equal to 99.8% for the N e = N v = 1 and 61.2% for the N e = N v = 4 case, while for db2, P e is 71% and 18%, respectively. Comparing these results with the P e values when applying PCA (see Table IV ), we can also conclude that applying PCA makes the features significantly more Gaussian.
F. Validation of the Analytic Expression of FRR and FAR
For both db1 and db2, we analytically estimate the genuine φ ge (k) and impostor φ im (k) HD pmfs, and the β(T ) and α(T ) curves. The results are shown in Figs. 16 and 17 for db1 and db2, respectively. The experimentally calculated pmfs are indicated by "Exp," while the ones obtained using the analytical model are indicated by "Mod." The experimental results are obtained using the same protocol as the one discussed in Section IV-C but storing the HD pmfs of each subject instead. We focus on the cases corresponding to N F = 31, with N e = N v = 1 and N e = N v = 4.
Both Figs. 16 and 17 indicate that there is a good agreement between φ im (k)-Exp and φ im (k)-Mod. Large differences are observed between φ ge (k)-Exp and φ ge (k)-Mod. However, the differences decrease when both N e and N v are increased. Averaging multiple independent samples leads to a higher Gaussianity degree in accordance with the central-limit theorem. This effect was also observed for the P e estimation results in the previous section. It is interesting to note the differences between the estimation errors of φ ge (k) of db1 and db2. For db1, the centers of gravity of φ ge (k)-Exp and φ ge (k)-Mod practically coincide. The only difference is the width of the pmfs since the experimentally obtained pmf is wider than the theoretical one. In case of db2, we see that there is both an alignment and a width error; φ ge (k)-Exp is skewed to the left.
Eventually, we are interested in estimating the DET curves. Because the DET curves combine both β and α, they are thus prone to estimation errors associated with β or α. The DET curves for db1 and db2 for N F = 31 with different values of N e and N v are shown in Fig. 18 . From this figure, we can conclude that increasing N e and N v leads to greater estimation errors of the DET curve, which contradicts the previous finding that increasing N e and N v leads to better estimations of P e and φ ge (k). This can be explained by the fact that in the N e = N v = 4 case, the area of interest with β(T ) ∈ [0.01, 0.1] occurs for smaller values of α(T ) because the number of bit errors decreases when N e and N v increase, i.e., the performance improves. As shown by the α(T ) curves in Figs. 16 and 17, there is a greater estimation error at smaller values of α(T ) thus amplifying the estimation error of the DET curve.
A summary of the probable causes for the observed differences, starting from the most probable, are as follows: 1) the nonhomogeneous within-class variance; 2) the dependence between features; and 3) the dependence between bit errors. The db2 seems to be clearly not adhering to the homogeneous within-class variance assumption, resulting into a skewed φ ge (k) with a large tail. Such a tail is caused by subjects that have, on average, a worse performance than the other subjects. These subjects have many feature components with a larger within-class variance leading to larger P e [j] values and thus, greater HDs. In the literature, these subjects are referred to as goats [25] , [26] . If the features are dependent, then the HD pmf becomes wider while keeping its original mean. This effect is visible for both φ ge (k) and φ im (k) for both databases. On the other hand, certain disturbances, such as occluded biometric images or strong biometric variabilities, can cause multiple errors to occur simultaneously. Thus, the bit errors are dependent, causing the tails on the right side of the genuine HD pmf. A right tail is slightly visible for db1 but is clearly present for db2, as shown in Fig. 16 In Section V, we propose a modified model that incorporates the nonhomogeneous within-class variance property, while in Section VI, we further extend the model to include dependences.
V. RELAXING THE HOMOGENOUS WITHIN-CLASS VARIANCE ASSUMPTION
In this section, we propose a modified model that takes the nonhomogeneous property into account, while still assuming independent feature components. The proposed method makes use of the approximation of the convolution of (2) with the binomial pmf. For the genuine case, this would bē
whereP ge e is the average bit-error probability across the feature componentsP
. The approximate pmfs φ ge (k) are shown in Fig. 19 (a) for db1 and Fig. 19(b) for db2 for the N e = N v = 4 case with N F = 31. For both databases, the approximation is reasonably accurate.
Thus we can model the nonhomogeneous effect by assuming thatP ge e,i is not equal for each subject and is distributed according to a probability density pP ge e . The following step consists in determining the pdf pP ge e across the population and computing the average genuine HD pmf defined as
where the integral limits are due to the fact that P e ∈ [0, 1/2] andφ ge (k|τ ) is the generic case of (28) as
We propose a method for estimating pP ge e using only the estimated within-class variance of each subjectσ The next step is to take the average ratio over all feature components as We can model the nonhomogeneous property by assuming that for all components of subject i, the within-class variance is σ
. If the homogeneous assumption holds and the number of features is large, then the pdf of κ i across the whole population becomes Gaussian with unit mean and a variance that decreases when N F increases. The variance decreases at larger values of N F because this would be similar to having N F times more samples and therefore, a better estimation of its mean. When there are "goatlike" subjects, the homogeneous assumption does not hold, then the variance of the pdf of κ i increases. Hence, in case 3, there is a clear existence of goats or doves, where the latter are the subjects that have a small number of bit errors when matched against themselves [27] . Fig. 20(b) compares the κ i pdf of case 1, db1, and db2. The results show that both db1 and db2 do not adhere to the homogeneous property. The κ i pdf found for db1 looks similar to case 3. However, the pdf found for db2 significantly deviates from the synthetic cases, which confirms the existence of goats and doves. This may also explain the significant discrepancy found when estimating the genuine HD pmfs of db2, as shown in Fig. 17 . Now, we can empirically estimate the probability density pP ge e using p κ i . The relationship between κ i andP ge e,i is given bȳ
where we take the average of P 
We applied this new method for estimating φ ge (k) of db1 and db2, and the results are shown in Fig. 21 show that φ ge -Exp is better approximated when using the new methodΦ ge (k)-Mod2. In the case of db1, there is a small improvement, but for db2, there is a significant improvement, and even a better estimation is obtained when N e = N v = 4. Furthermore, Fig. 21 (e)-(h) shows the DET curve results. In Fig. 21 (e) and (f), the same α is used for each DET curve in order to isolate the estimation errors of φ ge (k), while in Fig. 21(g ) and (h), α-Exp is used for the Exp curves and α-Mod is used for both the Mod and Mod2 curves. With the new method, the DET curve estimation has improved, most significantly for db2. However, the differences between Fig. 21 (e) and (f) and Fig. 21(g ) and (h) clearly indicate that the remaining estimation errors are caused by the estimation of α. As shown in Fig. 16(c) and (d) and Fig. 17(c) and (d) , there is an estimation error of (φ im ), which we consider to be caused by the fact that the feature components are dependent.
VI. INCORPORATING FEATURE-COMPONENT DEPENDENCES
In the previous section, we observed that a significant part of the remaining DET estimation errors is related to the estimation errors of the (φ im )-Exp pmf. In this section, we propose a further extension of the analytical framework in order to incorporate dependences between feature components. We propose to estimate the dependence from the (φ im ) pmf and apply it to the φ ge pmf estimation. Hence, we assume that both pmfs are influenced by the dependence to the same extent.
We estimate the dependence from (φ im )-Exp by fitting it with a Gaussian approximation of the binomial pmf of (9) with the variance as the fitting parameter. For large values of N F , the binomial pmf with probability P e and dimension N F can be approximated by the Gaussian density N (N F P e , N F P e (1 − P e )), with mean N F P e and variance N F P e (1 − P e ). For the impostor case, we know that P e = 1/2, from which its mean and variance become N F /2 and N F /4, respectively. Hence, the Gaussian approximation of the (φ im )-Exp pmf with the variance parameter ϑ used for fitting becomes
where the optimal ϑ is computed by minimizing the meansquare error as
The estimation results of ϑ opt for the N e = N v = 1 case are shown in Fig. 22 for both databases. The optimal value of ϑ opt is 1.11 for db1 and 1.17 for db2. For both databases, ϑ opt is very similar, which may indicate that the amount of dependences between the feature components is relatively similar for both databases. Furthermore, the (φ im )-Exp pmf is better estimated when compared with its first estimation disregarding the feature-component dependences, as shown in Fig. 16(c) and Fig. 17(c) for db1 and db2, respectively.
With the Gaussian approximation including the variance correction with ϑ opt , we have a better estimation of the φ ge pmf by rewriting (33) as
with σ 2 cor = ϑ opt N FP ge e,i (1 −P ge e,i ). Because of the Gaussian approximation errors, it does not hold that the sum of the probability mass is equal to one; therefore, we normalize it according to φ ge (k) = 1
The estimation results using (37) for the cases of ϑ = 1 and ϑ = ϑ opt are shown in Fig. 23 . For the ϑ = 1 case, the Gaussian approximation is used without the variance correction. Fig. 23(a)-(d) shows that the φ ge (k) pmf estimation has slightly improved. TheΦ ge -Mod-ϑ opt curve is closer to φ ge (k)-Exp thanΦ ge -Mod-ϑ 1 . This holds across the whole curve for the N e = N v = 1 case and mainly for the right tail for the N e = N v = 4 case. The same conclusions are also shown by the DET curves of Fig. 23(e)-(f) , where each DET curve uses the same α curve, namely, the experimentally obtained α-Exp, in order to isolate the φ ge (k) pmf estimation errors. The DET curves in Fig. 23(g)-( h) use the actual α curves, thus α-Mod-ϑ 1 for the DET-Mod-ϑ 1 curves and α-Mod-ϑ opt for the DET-Mod-ϑ opt curves, respectively. The curves show that the DET-Mod-ϑ opt curve is clearly closer to DET-Exp curve because α-Mod-ϑ opt is a better approximation of α-Exp as we have shown earlier.
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the previous sections, we have presented several analytical models for estimating the DET performance curve. However, as stated previously, because of the use of an ECC, the FRR is LB bounded because of the limited number of bits the ECC can correct. For the setting of N F = 31, which is equal to the codeword length n c , the BCH ECC can correct up to 7 bits, as shown in Table I . The experimentally achieved performance and its analytical estimates at this operating point are given in Table V. The results indicate that at this operating point, there is not a significant difference between the estimations using the Mod and Mod2 models, while the Mod-ϑ opt estimator leads to the best estimation where its significant improvement is of the α.
Although we have presented an analytical framework for analysis, it could also be used in practical cases. For example, consider the scenario where a database has been collected with a maximum of five samples per subject. Hence, the performance could only be calculated for cases where N e + N v ≤ 5. However, this restriction does not hold for our proposed analytical framework. By estimating σ 2 w , σ 2 b , κ i , and ϑ opt from the given database, the performance could be estimated for the cases where N e + N v ≥ 5. Either the performance could be estimated for a specific N e and N v setting or the LB bounds of the N e and N v setting could be estimated in order to obtain a certain performance or better. Given the same scenario as with Table V where the performance is estimated at the maximum error capability of the ECC for both databases, db1 is expected to reach β ≤ 0.1 when N e = N v ≥ 8, while N e = N v ≥ 7 for db2.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an analytical framework for estimating the DET performance curve of a biometric system, based on binary feature vectors, for different settings of N e and N v .
The first proposed estimation method used a simple PGC framework for modeling the pdf of the real-valued features. Each component has its own channel with the corresponding additive Gaussian noise representing the biometric variability and measurement noise, called the within-class variability. The results showed significant estimation errors and were far from optimal, mainly because of the homogeneous within-class variance assumption. Consequently, we proposed a modified framework to incorporate the nonhomogeneous property, which in fact assumes that the within-class variance is different for each subject. The estimation improved significantly, and the remaining estimation error is thought to be caused by the estimation errors of the false acceptance curve due to dependence between the feature components and corresponding bits. The final proposed framework also incorporated feature-component dependence, whose value was derived from the calculated impostor HD pmf of the database. This method resulted in the most optimum estimation of the DET performance curves.
